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wholesalers handled products other than Scripto's and thus were agents
for several principals." The sales and activities of the Florida wholesalers
were deemed to be a sufficient emanation of the corporation in Florida to
justify Florida's requirement that Scripto be its tax collector.
In the absence of any Congressional legislation' 2 prohibiting a state
from requiring an out-of-state vendor to be its tax collector in situations
where the contact between the two is slim, the Court must determine in
each case whether the minimum contact has been made so as not to be
violative of due process.' 3
 The test is "simply the nature and extent of
the activities"" of the corporation in the taxing state. The activities of
Script() through the Florida wholesalers were regular, systematic and pro-
ductive of a substantial flow of goods from Script() into Florida. The Court
was correct in not allowing these activities to be clouded by the tagging of
the Florida wholesalers as independent contractors.
PAUL L. BARRETT
Contracts—Conflict of Laws—Severability of Arbitration Clause.—
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Lummus Co.'—The Lummus Com-
pany is engaged in designing and constructing oil refineries. On the
basis of certain cost and profitability estimates by Lummus, the Common-
wealth Co. contracted in New York with Lummus in 1954 for the con-
struction of an oil refinery and again in 1956 for expansion of the
effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida.... To permit
such formal 'contractual shifts' to make a constitutional difference would open
the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance."
11 Id. at 211.
12 Congress can, of course, under its power to regulate commerce, enact legislation
which would deny a state the power to require a corporation engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce to become the state's tax collector when the only nexus between
the two is the active solicitation of sales by the corporation's agents. Legislation to
this effect was introduced in both Houses of Congress after the Scripto decision was
handed down. H.R. 12, 235, S. 3549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
13
 Although the amount of contact necessary to subject a foreign corporation to
the jurisdiction of the state for a valid "in personam" judgment in causes of action
arising out of the activities of the corporation within the state may not be co-extensive
with the minimum contact necessary to permit a state to require the foreign vendor to
be its tax collector, a close parallel between the two might be drawn. This is especially
so where the cause of action in the "in personam" suit is not based upon a tort involving
a dangerous instrumentality. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927). The test as promulgated in International Shoe Inc. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), for subjecting a foreign corporation to an "in personam" judgment
is whether or not there is a certain minimum contact between the state and the corpora-
tion so that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are not offended
if the corporation is to be required to defend a suit in the state where the cause of
action arose. This test, in substance, is also applied to situations wherein a court must
determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated when a state attempts
to make an extrastate corporation its tax collector.
14 362 U.S. at 212.
1 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1960).
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facilities. Both contracts provided for arbitration in New York of "any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement . . ."
Commonwealth experienced severe losses and it refused to make further
payments to Lummus who in turn served notice of arbitration with the
American Arbitration Service. 2 Commonwealth, in the Puerto Rico Federal
District Court, sought relief in damages and such rescission of the contract as
was possible, alleging fraudulent inducement in the making of the substantive
contract. Lummus then sought to compel arbitration in a Federal District
Court in New York. The Puerto Rico Court upon motion by Common-
wealth enjoined Lummus from further proceeding in that action, and when
it refused to modify that injunction, Lummus took an interlocutory appeal
from the order. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered
judgment vacating the orders of the Puerto Rico District Court. HELD:
(1) that New York law should govern the controversy and ( 2) that although
under New York law an arbitration clause is unseverable from the sub-
stantive contract true rescission was not properly sought and the question
of damages for fraudulent inducement can and will be determined by
arbitration.
While the history of the conflict of laws surrounding the arbitration of
contracts is relatively short, it is both full and virile. The United States
Arbitration Act2 provided that a clause to arbitrate in contracts involving
maritime matters or interstate commerce shall be valid, enforceable and
irrevocable. Originally the Act was intended to serve as Congressional
regulation of federal judicial procedure, 4 and thus arbitration enforcement
was deemed remedial and applicable in any case before the federal courts.
During the reign of Swift v. Tyson 5 a federal court exercising its jurisdic-
tion on the ground of diversity of citizenship was free to look where it
would for its substantive law. The celebrated decision of Erie v. Tompkins6
held that in the interpretation of private contracts where no federal issue
was involved the substantive laws of the forum state were controlling upon the
federal courts. The application of this doctrine to arbitration clauses was
not free from inconsistencies in the lower federal courts; 7 if the court
2 This is not, however, the equivalent of, nor does it give rise to, a civil action
brought in a court. Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
3 The Act was originally enacted in 1925. 43 Stat. 833 (1925), 9 U.S.C. H 1-15.
It was repealed and substantially reenacted in 1947. 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 1-14
(1958). Section 2 provides:
" .	 a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, ir-
revocable and enforceable save on such grounds as exist in law or equity for the
revocation of any contract."
4 H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1924).
5 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1, 18 (1842).
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 Sturges, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States
Arbitration Act, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580 (1953); Kochery, The Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie v. Tompkins, 39 Cornell L.Q. 74
(1953). •
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viewed arbitration as substantive, state law governed; if it was viewed
as procedural, federal "common law" could be applied. The Erie effect
was not precisely determined until Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. a f America.8
Here -
 it was held that in those cases in which a federal court acquires
jurisdiction as a result of the diversity of citizenship between the parties
and where the contract containing the arbitration clause does not involve
maritime matters or interstate commerce, the court must look to state law to
determine whether or not the arbitration clause is specifically enforceable.
It was important that the distinction be made between the validity and
enforceability of an arbitration clause, and that particular set of procedural
tools that is the manner of its enforcement. In Bernhardt the court declared:
"The federal court enforces the state-created right by the rules of procedure
which it has acquired from the federal government, and which therefore
are not identical with those of the state courts. Yet in spite of the differ-
ence in procedure, a federal court enforcing a state-created right in a
diversity case is as we said in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Yorke
in substance 'only another court of the state.' "1° The court went on to point
out that where a state court will not compel arbitration, for a federal court
to do so would "substantially effect(s) the cause of action created by the
state" which, in turn, might make a radical difference in the ultimate result.
The problem, then, of Commonwealth v. Lumnius was: Whose law
should the court apply? Federal jurisdiction was founded upon diversity of
citizenship only and not upon any federal question" nor was the contract
one which involved maritime matters or interstate commerce so as to make
applicable the Federal Arbitration Act.' 2
 In this light, Judge Aldrich,
recognizing the limitations of Bernhardt, turned to the law of a "state"
but to the law of New York rather than that of Puerto Rico.
Commonwealth Co. contended that in the light of the decision in
Bernhardt the court should have adopted not only the substantive law of
the forum but its procedural and conflict of laws provisions as well. The
court rejected this interpretation as well as rejecting the forum's express
adoption of Puerto Rican law. Thus, while the arbitration clause was
treated as unseverable from the substantive contract, as it would be under
the law both of Puerto Rico and of New York, 13 the Court refused to look
8 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
9 326 US. 99, 108 (1945).
10 Supra note 8, at 203.
11 Suits involving the application of the Arbitration Act do not furnish an inde-
pendent basis of federal jurisdiction. In addition to a "contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving interstate commerce (or maritime matters)," there must be diversity or
a right arising under the law of the United States plus the proper amount in controversy.
San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 310
(2d Cir. 1947). See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
12 This is apparently the construction made in the instant case. See Badgett Mines
Stripping Corp. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 173 F. Supp. 425 (M.D. Pa.
1959) ; Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947).
13 Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Lummus Company, 174 F. Supp. 485, 488
(1959).
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to the decision of the Puerto Rico District Court to 'stay arbitration and
to hear the issue of fraud. In Bernhardt it was asserted that the court should
give "special weight" to the findings and determinations of the judge of the
forum." In the instant case the judge of the forum found that a "sub-
stantial dispute" had arisen as to whether the contracts had been induced
by fraud that would nullify both the contracts and the arbitration clauses
that they contained." Commonwealth argued that the denial of the
remedy given by the Puerto Rico District Court is a denial gravely
prejudicing its substantive rights. It is submitted that its contention is
valid.
In his concurring opinion in Bernhardt Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated
that the basic nature of diversity jurisdiction "is the enforcement of state
created rights and state policies going to the heart of those rights.""
(emphasis supplied.) The problem in that case was strikingly similar to
that of Commonwealth v. Lummus. In both cases the contracts were made in
New York and arbitration was to be held in New York. In both cases the
issue of whether arbitration could be employed arose in a court other than
New York. In Bernhardt the court indicated that the law of the forum
should govern yet in Commonwealth the law of the place of the contract
governed. In Bernhardt the court gave special weight to the findings of the
local judge, yet here the court by-passed the determinations explicitly
rendered by the court of the forum. The desirability of having arbitration
where the parties intended is well established yet this consideration is
necessarily subsequent to the decision of whether arbitration is to be
granted at all."
In the light of the court's adoption of New York law as governing,
when it turned its attention to the issue of the severability of the arbitra-
tion clause from the substantive contract it accepted the dictates inherent
in previous New York decisions. In Wrap-Vertiser v. Plotnick" the court
asserted that had Plotnick asked for rescission the issue of fraud would
have to have been decided first so as to determine whether there was a contract
14 Supra note 8, at 204.
15 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3204 (1956).
16 Supra note 8, at 208 -09.
17 Ross v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 236 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956);
Jackson v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 144 F. Supp. 551 (N.J. 1956) ; Miller v. American
Insurance Co. of Newark, 124 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Ark. 1954); Lorensen, ComMercial
Arbitration—International and Interstate Aspects, 43 Yale L.J. 716, 755-57 (1934). In
the instant case, the denial of a judicial hearing on the issue of fraud was based upon the
court's decision that there had not been a good faith manifestation by Commonwealth
of its intention to rescind and return the benefits it received and that laches had set in.
Notwithstanding the complications of what in fact could and should be returned' under
a construction contract, it seems that the Circuit Court has determined facts outside its
appellate scope and invaded the function of the District Court. Fountain v. Filson, 336
U.S. 681 (1949) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 529-33 (1958). In its
discretion and consideration of the facts the District Court had not passed on these
defenses and by doing so, if it had not implicitly found differently, it had at least
deferred them to be treated at the plenary trial of the alleged fraud.
18 3 N.Y.2d 17, 19, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641, 143 N.E.2d 366, 367 (1957).
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over which the arbitrators would have jurisdiction, as fraud makes the
whole contract voidable." The case held that even though the contract
was affirmed, the particular clause2° was not sufficiently broad to encompass
the question of fraud in the inducement of the substantive contract. Sub-
sequently New York has specifically recognized that an arbitration clause
may be broad enough to include such fraud and that the contract need
not be rescinded to recover 2 1
A leading federal case, Robert Lawrence v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 22
held that where interstate commerce or maritime matters are concerned
the United States Arbitration Act is controlling as substantive federal law
and that under such federal law an arbitration clause is a severable agreement.
Thus it is immaterial whether a contract is affirmed or rescinded, for the
arbitration clause will be treated as a separate contract and without fraud
going directly to it, fraudulent inducement will be arbitrated. The extent to
which this notion is accepted in other federal courts, however, is uncertain.23
In Commonwealth v. Lummus the court interpreted Commonwealth's
plea as an affirmation of the contract and an action for damages in tort for
deceit, which was arbitrable. It is doubtful that the necessary implications
of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. were employed by the court in its decision.
The case illustrates the increasing tendency of the courts to call upon the
obvious advantages of a skilled and experienced arbitration panel to solve
difficult and involved problems in a business context. It also serves the
useful purpose of helping to clear the courts' congested dockets. Perhaps
the court's haste to accomplish these two objectives is in part accountable
for its decision.
PAUL T. O'GRADY
19 See also, Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, Inc., 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N.Y. Supp.
96 (1926), rev'd on other grounds, 245 N.Y. 375, 157 N.E. 272 (1927); Manufacturers
Chemical Co. v. Caswell & Strauss & Co., 259 App. Div. 321, 19 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1940);
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Dewitt Dev. Corp., 150 Misc. 408, 269 N.Y.
Supp. 104 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
20 The clause went to the "validity, interpretation or performance of this agree-
ment." 3 N.Y.2d at 20, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 641, 143 N.E.2d at 367.
21 Amerotron v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d
214 (1957); M. W. Kellogg Co. v. Monsanto Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 744, 192 N.Y.S.2d
869 (1959); see also, Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co. v. Amerotron Corp., 339 Mass. 252,
158 N.E.2d 875 (1959).
22 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), dismissed, 364
U.S. 801 (1960).
23 American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson C.A.13., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.
1959)—where the court maintained that an arbitration clause was valid and enforceable
only "in accordance with ordinary contract principles under applicable State and Fed-
eral law" (at pp. 815-17); see also, Ross v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 236
F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956).
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